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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SHIRE DEVELOPMENT, a Utah
corporation; and ALBERT
CHARBONEAU, an individual,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

Case No. 890376

FRONTIER INVESTMENTS, a
Nevada limited partners!
MARK CHILTON; KATHRYN W.
CHILTON; ROGER S. TROUNDAY
GAIL TROUNDAY; WARD W.
CHILTON; and STEVEN R.
TROUNDAY,
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Defendants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENTS
FRONTIER INVESTMENTS, MARK CHILTON,
KATHRYN W. CHILTON, ROGER S. TROUNDAY, GAIL TROUNDAY,
WARD W. CHILTON, and STEVEN R. TROUNDAY
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recovery :• payments made on a real estate contract to which
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they were not parties and for which they have not received an
assignment from the purchaser?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below.

Appellants Shire and Charboneau initiated this action
against Frontier Investments and its individual partners
(collectively "Frontier") to recover payments made to Frontier
pursuant to a contract for the sale of real property.

The

contract was entered into between Frontier as seller and Steven
T. Glezos ("Glezos") as buyer.

After Frontier and Glezos

entered into the contract, Glezos allegedly entered into an
oral agreement with Shire and Charboneau under which Glezos and
Shire and Charboneau agreed to purchase the property as a joint
venture.

Frontier was not a party to this alleged oral

agreement.
After making payments of $90,725.11, Glezos defaulted
on the contract by failing to make a payment of $83,744.00,
when due.

In accordance with the terms of the* sales contract,

Frontier terminated the contract, retook possession of the
property, and retained the payments previously made on the
contract.
Shire and Charboneau then filed this action claiming
the liquidated damages clause and forfeiture provisions
contained in the contract were unenforceable as an illegal
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penalty.

However, Shire and Charboneau were not parties to the

sales contract and have not received an assignment of the
contract.

The lower court accordingly granted Frontier*s

motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the
grounds that Shire and Charboneau lack standing to bring this
action.
B.
1.

Statement of Facts.
On or about October 22, 1984, Frontier entered

into a written real estate contract with Glezos under which
Glezos agreed to purchase .841 acres of real property located
in Wendover, Elko County, Nevada, for a total purchase price of
$126,150.00.
2.

(R. 70-71)
On or about November 1, 1984, Frontier entered

into a second real estate contract (the "Contract") with Glezos
under which Glezos agreed to purchase a larger parcel of
property containing 5.997 acres which included the original
parcel described in the October contract.

This Contract

terminated the earlier contract and gave credit to Glezos for
the amounts paid under the earlier contract.

The purchase

price of the property under the Contract was $765,494.00.
(R. 71)
3.

Both contracts were entered into solely between

Frontier and Glezos.

In entering into the contracts, Frontier

dealt solely with Glezos and intended to and has looked solely
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to Glezos for performance.

Frontier did not negotiate or

contract with either Shire or Charboneau.
4.

(R. Ill)

Paragraph 13 of the Contract provides in

pertinent part:
In the event Buyer defaults in performing this
Contract or defaults in making any payment ...
and such default is not cured within thirty (30)
days after written notice by Seller specifying
the default ... the Seller, at Seller's option
shall have the following remedies:
A. Seller shall have the right to
terminate this Contract and forfeit all
the rights of the Buyer hereunder and
in and to the property sold and to be
released from all obligations in law
and in equity to convey the property
sold or any portion thereof, and all
payments which have been made
theretofore on this Contract by the
Buyer shall be forfeited to the Seller
as liquidated damages for the
nonperformance of this Contract....
(R. 103)
5.

At sometime after Frontier and Glezos entered

into the Contract, Glezos allegedly entered into an oral
agreement with Shire and Charboneau to purchase the property as
a joint venture.
6.

(R. 3)

Frontier had no knowledge of the oral agreement

entered into between Glezos and Shire and Charboneau, did not
participate in any of the negotiations leading to the
agreement, and was not a party to the agreement.
7.

(R. 113)

Under the terms of the Contract, a payment of

$83,744.00 became due on February 20, 1985.
make the payment when it became due.
-4-

Glezos did not

(R. 4, 40)

8.

By letter dated March 28, 1985, Frontier elected

to and did terminate the Contract and retained all funds
previously paid thereon.
9.

(R. 4, 40)

On or about August 29, 1985, Glezos initiated an

action in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah against Frontier seeking to recover a portion of the
payments paid to Frontier pursuant to the terms of the
Contract.
10.

(R. 112)
In September 1986, Shire and Charboneau moved to

intervene as plaintiffs in the United States District Court
action by filing a proposed complaint in invention together
with a motion and lengthy memorandum.
11.

(R. 112)

Frontier incurred considerable expense preparing

and filing a memorandum in opposition to the motion for leave
to intervene only to have the motion withdrawn by Shire and
Charboneau without any explanation being provided to Frontier.
(R. 112)
12.

In or about September 1987, Frontier and Glezos

settled the dispute that was the basis of the United States
District Court action and stipulated to an order of dismissal.
On October 20, 1987, the United States District Court entered
an order dismissing the action against Frontier.
13.

(R. 112)

Plaintiffs Shire and Charboneau filed the instant

action on or about February 29, 1988. (R. 2)
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14.

On August 4, 1989, the lower court entered

summary judgment dismissing Shire and Charboneau's complaint.
(R. 180)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A provision of a contract can only be challenged by a
party to the contract, an intended beneficiary of the contract,
or an assignee of a party to the contract.

Shire and

Charboneau were not parties to the contract, were not intended
beneficiaries of the contract, and have not received an
assignment from a party to the contract.

The Agreement between

Glezos and Shire and Charboneau dated September 25, 1986 does
not constitute an assignment but is merely an agreement to
share in the proceeds of any settlement or judgment obtained by
Glezos from Frontier.

Similarly, the alleged joint venture

agreement violates the statute of frauds and does not
constitute an assignment of Glezos? interest in the real
property.

Thus, Shire and Charboneau lack standing to maintain

their action.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
To determine whether summary judgment was properly
entered, this Court should employ the same analytical standard
as that of the trial court.

Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767

P.2d 941, 946 (Utah App. 1989).
-6-

Summary judgment should

appropriately be entered if the pleadings and all other
submissions show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.

Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d

1390, 1391 (Utah 1980).

Summary judgment should be denied only

if there are genuine issues of "material" fact.

"[T]he mere

existence of genuine issue of fact in the case as a whole does
not preclude the entry of summary judgment if those issues are
immaterial to the resolution of the case."

Horgan v.

Industrial Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982).

An

issue of fact is material only if it could lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.

Matsushita

Elec. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Shire and Charboneau assert that summary judgment was
inappropriate because there are issues of fact regarding
whether the payments retained by Frontier as liquidated damages
bear a reasonable relationship to Frontier's actual damages.
Even assuming such issues exist, they are immaterial.
and Charboneau lack standing to even bring this action.
we don't even get to the issue of damages.

Shire
Thus,

The lower court

properly granted summary judgment.
II.
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT SHIRE AND
CHARBONEAU LACK STANDING TO BRING THIS ACTION
Shire and Charboneau1s complaint alleges that the
liquidated damages and forfeiture provisions of the Contract
-7-

are unenforceable as an illegal penalty.

However, the validity

of a provision in an agreement can only be challenged by a
party to the agreement or by a party whom the contract was
intended to benefit.

Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings,

Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977); Wyatt v. Bowers, 747
P.2d 881, 882 (Nev. 1987); Olsen v. Iacometti, 533 P.2d 1360,
1364 (Nev. 1975).

Shire and Charboneau were not parties to the

Contract and cannot claim to be intended beneficiaries of the
Contract inasmuch as the alleged joint venture agreement was
entered into subsequent to the Contract.
Commercial Fixtures is closely on point.

In that

case, a real property owner leased the property to a lessee.
The lessee then contracted with the plaintiff for the purchase
of materials that were incorporated into a building on the
leased premises.

The owner was not a party to that agreement.

When the lessee failed to pay for the materials the plaintiff
sued the owner for the value of the materials under a theory of
unjust enrichment.

Because there was no contractual

relationship between the owner and the plaintiff, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not recover.

The

Court ruled that the right of the plaintiff to recover against
the owner "must be based upon an agreement."

Id. at 774.

Likewise in this case there is no contractual
relationship between Frontier and Shire and Charboneau.
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Shire's and Charboneaufs only agreement was with Glezos.

Their

remedy is thus against Glezos pursuant to the joint venture
agreement.
A.

The Proceeds Sharing Agreement Dated September

25, 1986 Between Glezos and Shire and Charboneau Does Not
Constitute an Assignment.
Shire and Charboneau argued below and again on appeal
that they can maintain this action because they received an
assignment of an interest in the Contract from Glezos.

They

claim the agreement dated September 25, 1986 between Glezos,
Shire, and Charboneau (the "Proceeds Sharing Agreement"), a
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum 1, constitutes a
valid assignment of Glezos1 interest in the real property.
This argument is meritless.
The Proceeds Sharing Agreement does not purport to
assign Glezos' interest in the property to Shire and
Charboneau.

It is merely an agreement to share the proceeds of

any judgment or settlement obtained by Glezos against Frontier
in the United States District Court action.

In Hansen v.

Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102, 1104 (Utah Ct. App. 1988),
the Utah Court of Appeals recently held language indicating
that an assignment, transfer, conveyance, or assumption of an
interest in real property is intended is necessary to create a
valid assignment of a real estate contract.

The Proceeds

Sharing Agreement does not contain such language.

-9-

In Hansen, a seller of real property obtained a
judgment and decree of foreclosure against the original buyer
under the terms of a uniform real estate contract.

The seller

also attempted to obtain a judgment against a subsequent buyer
who had purchased the property from the original buyer on a
second uniform real estate contract.

The Utah Court of Appeals

affirmed a dismissal of the seller's claims against the
subsequent buyer, holding that the uniform real estate contract
did not constitute an assignment of the original contract and
that therefore there was no privity of contract between the
seller and the subsequent buyer.

The Court held that if the

parties had intended an assignment, such a provision could have
been stated in the contract with specificity.

The Court

stated: "Notably absent are the usual words of either an
assumption or an assignment, such as 'assumes,1 'agrees to
pay,' 'assigns,1 'transfers' or 'conveys.'"

Id.

The Court

also stated:
What we have in this case is a subpurchase
by a subpurchaser by means of a subcontract. A
subcontract by the [original purchaser] to sell
to [the subsequent purchaser] under an executory
land contract is not an assignment, but a
separate, independent contract between them. The
subpurchase creates between the orig;inal vendor
and the [subsequent purchaser] privity of
estate, but does not in the absence of
agreement, create privity of contract between
them.
748 P.2d 1104 n.2 (emphasis in original).
The Proceeds Sharing Agreement between Glezos, Shire,
and Charboneau does not even constitute a subpurchase
-10-

agreement, let alone an assignment.

The agreement contains no

language indicating a transfer of an interest in real property
is intended and is merely an agreement to share in the proceeds
of the federal court lawsuit.
Additionally, the Proceeds Sharing Agreement was
entered into after Glezos had forfeited his interest in the
property to Frontier under the terms of the Contract.

At the

time the Proceeds Sharing Agreement was entered into, Glezos
had no interest in the property to assign.
B.

The Oral Joint Venture Agreement Is Not A Valid

Assignment.
Shire and Charboneau also claim that the oral joint
venture agreement somehow "by operation of law" constitutes an
assignment of Glezos? interest in the real property.
argument fails for several reasons.

This

First, oral assignments

are invalid under both the Utah and Nevada statutes of
frauds.1

The Utah statute of frauds provides in pertinent

part :
No estate or interest in real property ...
shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered
or declared otherwise than by ... deed or
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same....

1

There is a conflicts of law issue as to whether the Utah
or the Nevada statute of frauds should be applied. The
property sold is located in Nevada but the Contract was entered
into, as least in part, in Utah. Nevertheless, because both
statutes are substantively identical it is unnecessary to
resolve the issue.
-11-

Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-1 (1988).

The Nevada statute of frauds

provides in pertinent part:
No estate or interest in lands ... shall be
created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared ... unless ... by deed or conveyance, in
writing, subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring
the same....
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 111.205 (1987).
A case closely on point is Goats v. Bayless Markets,
Inc., 481 P.2d 536 (Ariz. App. 1971).

In Goats, a lessor

leased space for a bakery to the lessees.

Upon the lessees1

default in making payments on the lease, the lessor evicted the
lessees and retook possession of the bakery.

The plaintiff

claimed to have received an oral assignment of the lease from
the lessees and brought suit against the lessor for
conversion.

Holding that the alleged oral assignment was

invalid under the statute of frauds, the court stated:
With respect to plaintiff's assertion that
the [lessees] had orally assigned their interest
as lessees of the Gingham Girl Bakery to
plaintiff, such action, even if it had taken
place, could not in any way be binding upon [the
lessor] without its knowledge and consent since
the lease in question was one for more than one
year duration and would therefore be within the
Statute of Frauds....
481 P.2d at 540.

Likewise, the alleged oral joint venture

agreement is in no way binding upon Frontier,,
Shire and Charboneau alternatively assert that joint
venture agreements for the purchase of real property need not
be in writing.

Such is true if the agreements merely govern
-12-

the relationship and obligations as between the purchasing
joint venturers themselves and do not purport to transfer an
interest in real property.

Such agreements may give one joint

venturer a claim against another joint venturer for proceeds
derived from property obtained by one joint venturer in his own
name on behalf of the joint venture.

This is all the cases

cited by Shire and Charboneau stand for.

See Ellingson v.

Sloan, 527 P.2d 1100 (Ariz. App. 1975); Harestad v. Weitzel,
536 P.2d 522 (Or. 1975).

However, such agreements do not give

a joint venturer rights against a seller who contracted only
with another joint venturer.
Any agreement purporting to transfer an interest in
real property must be in writing.2
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 111.205.

Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-1;

Shire and Charboneau may have a

claim against Glezos pursuant to the oral joint venture
agreement but the oral agreement gives them no claim against
Frontier.
Furthermore, as Judge Daniels ruled, Glezos did not
intend the oral joint venture agreement to be an assignment.

2

Shire and Charboneau assert that the lower court expressly
rejected Frontier's assertion that any assignment would have to
be in writing. This is not completely accurate. The court did
not expressly rule on the issue. The court's entry of summary
judgment was based on the grounds that Shire and Charboneau had
not received an assignment from Glezos. Implicit in this
ruling is that an assignment would have to be in writing. See
the portion of the transcript of the hearing containing the
lower court's order attached hereto as Addendum 2.
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In the Release of Claims executed by Glezos in settlement of
the United States District Court action, a copy of which is
attached hereto as Addendum 3, Glezos reserves the right to
assign his rights to Shire and Charboneau.

If Glezos had

assigned his rights to Shire and Charboneau in the oral joint
venture agreement a year earlier, he would have no rights left
to reserve.

The oral joint venture agreement does not

constitute an assignment.
Shire and Charboneau attempt to muddy the waters in
this case by arguing that Frontier may have subsequently
learned of the alleged joint venture agreement because Glezos
made installment payments due under the contract with checks
drawn on Shire's bank account.

This argument is immaterial.

Even if Frontier had learned of the alleged oral agreement,
such knowledge would not create an assignment of Glezos1
interest to Shire and Charboneau.

Without being a party to the

contract or receiving an assignment of Glezos1 interest, Shire
and Charboneau have no standing to bring this action.
CONCLUSION
Shire and Charboneau were not parties to the real
estate sales contract entered into between Frontier and Glezos
and have not received an assignment from Glezos of his interest
in the property.

Neither can Shire and Charboneau be intended

beneficiaries of the Contract.
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Inasmuch as the oral joint

venture agreement was not entered into until after the
Contract, Glezos and Frontier could not have intended to
benefit Shire and Charboneau.

Shire and Charboneau are thus

not in privity with Frontier and lack standing to challenge the
liquidated damages provision of the contract.
This court should affirm the summary judgment
dismissing the complaint entered by the lower court in this
action.
DATED this y

day of December, 1989.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
David A. Greenwood
Marvin D. Bagley

>rneys for Defendants/
Respondents
50 South Main Street,'SuiTte 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

2631b
120489
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused four copies of the
within and foregoing Brief of the Respondents to be mailed,
postage prepaid, this "/ — d a y of December, 1989, to the
following:
Stephen B. Mitchell
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL
139 East South Temple, Suite 2001
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

2631b
120489
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AGREEMENT

This Agreement is made and entered into this 25th day of
September, 1986, by and between STEVEN T. GLEZOS ("Glezos") and
SHIRE DEVELOPMENT, INC., a Utah corporation ("Shire") and BERT
CHARBONEAU ("Charboneau") by and through their respective
attorneys with reference to the following facts.
WHEREAS, Glezos has commenced a legal action in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Division, entitled:

Steven T. Glezos, Plantiff, v. Frontier

Investments, et al., Defendants, Civil No. 85C-1004G (the
"pending action"), in which action Glezos is seeking to recover
the sum of approximately $90,000.00 paid to Frontier Investments
for the purchase of certain real property located in the State
of Nevada (the "property"); and
WHEREAS, Charboneau contributed $30,000.00 for the
purchase of the property and Shire and Glezos also contributed
j|various sums for the purchase of the property; and
WHEREAS, Shire, Charboneau and Utah Crossing Ltd. have
filed a Motion in the pending action seeking leave to intervene
as Plaintiffs to assert a right to all or a portion of any funds
'!recovered from Frontier Investments;
NOW, THEREFORE, the parties hereby agree as follows:
1.

Glezos, Shire and Charboneau are entitled to share in

the proceeds of any judgment or settlement obtained from
Frontier Investments in the pending action, after deducting

A

—

^

0

0

0

1

4

S

pending action, in the same percentage as their respective
contributions toward the purchase of the property bear to the
total amount paid towards purchase of the property.
Charboneau's share of any settlement or judgment, based upon his
contribution of $30,000.00, shall be paid to him as soon as
possible after receipt of funds from Frontier Investments.

The

remainder of the funds received from Frontier Investments shall
i
I be placed in an interest-bearing account requiring both the
signatures of counsel for both Shire and Glezos for any
withdrawals pending an agreement between Shire and Glezos for
| the release of such funds.
2.

Any settlement of the pending action by Glezos shall

require written approval from any two of Glezos, Shire and
Charboneau.
3.

Shire and Charboneau shall cause the Motion to

Intervene in the pending action to be withdrawn.
4.

The undersigned attorneys represent and warrant that

they have the full right and authority from their respective
clients to execute this Agreement on their behalf.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this
Agreement the day and date first above written.

teven T. Glezos

0001431

BURBI

StefelMftftB. M i t c h e l l
A t t o r n e y s f o r S h i r e and
Charboneau
dd5401a
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are not there and there simply was no rights to begin with.
And there is no mutuality.

It is not an assignment.

There

is no privity of contract.

There's just the contractual

relationship between the parties, and they have no standing
to bring this action.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Well, I think the critical

issue is whether there is an assignment or not.

I don't

think I buy your Statute of Frauds argument, or the
mutuality argument, but the question really is, is there an
assignment or isn't there.
I don't think that Shire can sue on this contract
unless, either they were a party to the contract or an
assignee of party, and there are cases that only hold that
they can sue if they are an assignee.

And I just can't read

this agreement, this joint venture agreement to make them an
assignee.

Especially I don't think Glezos thought it was an

assignment, because a year later when he entered into this
settlement agreement, he specifically says in there, he, in
sole discretion, may assign rights to Shire, or may not. So
I just can't see it as being an assignment without an
assignment.
action.

I don't think Shire or Charboneau can bring the

If he does assign his rights sometime, maybe they

can, but based on the documents that are now before the
Court, I think that the Motion for Summary Judgment should
be granted.
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"EXHIBIT E
(Attached to and forming a part of the Real
Property Purchase Agreement, dated October
13, 1987, between Frontier Investments, as
Seller, and Steven T. Glezos, as Buyer.)
RELEASE OF CLAIMS
AND COVENANT NOT TO SUE
THIS RELEASE OF CLAIMS AND COVENANT NOT TO SUE ("Agreement")
is made and entered into as of the
day of November, 1987,
by and between FRONTIER
INVESTMENTS, a Nevada limited
partnership, (hereinafter referred to as "Frontier"), and STEVEN
T. GLEZOS, a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
(hereinafter referred to as "Glezos").
WITNESSETH
WHEREAS, Frontier and Glezos entered into that certain Real
Property Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase Agreement")
dated
October 13, 1987, for the purpose of settling the dispute between
them which is the subject of Civil No. 85C-10046 (the "Action")
filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah; and
WHEREAS, Section 1.5 of the Purchase Agreement requires that
the 3uyer release the Seller from certain claims and covenant not
to sue the Seller, as hereinafter set forth;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants and
promises
contained herein and other good and valuable
consideration, Frontier and Glezos agree as follows:
1.
Concurrently with the execution of this Agreement,
Frontier shall perform its obligations to Glezos pursuant to the
terms of the Purchase Agreement.
2.
Glezos, for himself and all persons claiming by,
through, or under him, does hereby release, acquit, and discharge
F r o n t i e r , and all of Frontier's
affiliated
entities,
corporations, partnerships, officers, directors, shareholders,
agents, partners, attorneys, employees, and representatives of
any nature, and their successors, heirs, and assigns, and each of
them from claims as follows:
(a)
In the Action, Glezos asserted damage claims of over
$90,000 relating to purchase agreements for real property in
Wendover, Nevada.
Glezos represents to Frontier that of the

ADDENDUM 3
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LO r r o m i e r

under

the d i s p u t e d

c o n t r a c t s , only

$11,000

came from the personal funds of Glezos, and that the remainder
came either from funds of Albert Charboneau or from funds
borrowed by Shire Development, Inc., a Utah corporation, from
l-.'oore Financial with guarantees from C.N. Zundel and Glezos.
(b)
Glezos hereby releases Frontier from all claims
relating to the $11,000 he personally provided for payments to
Frontier under the disputed real estate purchase agreements.
Clezcs foes net intend by giving sucn release to release or
effect in any way, favorably or unfavorably- any claims which
A l i e n Charboneau or Shire Development, Inc. may have acainst
Frontier relating to funds either of them provided for payment to
Frontier under the disputed real estate agreements.
Dy
mentioning the potential claims of Albert Charboneau and Shire
Development, Inc. in this release, Glezos does not intend to
enhance or strengthen those claims in any way or to create claims
if none exist.
Glezos does, however, specifically reserve the
right, in his sole discretion, to assign to Albert Charboneau
and/or Shire Development Inc. any claims he asserted in the
Action relating to funds provided by Albert Charboneau or Shire
Development, Inc. for payment to Frontier under the real estate
purchase agreements disputed in the Action.
By signing this
document, Glezos acknowledges that Frontier does not intend to
enhance or strengthen any potential claims of Albert Charboneau
or Shire Development, Inc. relating to the subject matter of the
Action or to create claims if none exist.
(c) Although Glezos reserves the right to assign to Albert
Charboneau and/or Shire Development, Inc. any claims Glezos
asserted in the Action relating to funds provided by Albert
Charboneau or Shire Development, Inc. for payment to Frontier
under the real estate purchase agreements disputed in the Action,
Glezos hereby covenants that he personally will not again sue
Frontier or any of the other parties named as defendants in the
Action for claims relating to the subject matter of the Action or
which arose prior to the date of this Agreement. This covenant
not to sue is personal to Glezos and is not intended to in any
way impair the rights, if any, of Albert Charboneau or Shire
Development, Inc. if Glezos assigns claims to either or both of
them relating to funds they provided for payment to Frontier
under the disputed real estate purchase agreements.
3.
The parties hereto warrant and agree in executing this
Release of Claims and Covenant Not to Sue that they have relied
on their own judgment, belief and knowledge and not on the
representations or statements made by any of the parties released
or anyone representing them, except such representations as are
set forth in the Purchase Agreement.
4.
The reservation by Glezos of the alleged claims of
Albert Charboneau and Shire Development, Inc. against Frontier
shall not for any purpose- be deemed or argued, to be an admission
of responsibility or an acknowledgement of the accuracy of any

allegations made
or Glezos.
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